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Abstract 
This is an essay at retrieval and reconstruction. It seeks to re-
trieve a strand of international trade theory which was formulated with 
stark clarity by Josiah Tucker in the eighteenth century and which has 
been revived recently by a number of economists. It seeks also to re-
trieve a dissenting body of thought which emerged as a discourse in po-
litical economy and which saw colonialism as a grave infringement against 
the tenets of a commercial or capitalist society. This dissent is exempli-
fied by the writings of Tucker, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Anthony 
Lambert and Lord Lauderdale. Finally, it seeks to reconstruct the dis-
course of political economy by putting it back in the context of issues of 
governance, social transformation, and the ethics of colonial rule from 
which it was extracted and thereby impoverished in the course of the 
nineteenth century. In order to distinguish it from all the new-fangled 
strands of neo-liberal political economy, or Ricardian political economy, 
it may be styled as contextual or historical political economy. Such a 
designation would also show its affiliation to the apparatus of contextual 
political thought that has been constructed in recent years by J.G.A. 
Pocock. John Dunn and Quentin Skinner. 
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Political e c o n o m y : a discourse of mastery or an 
a p p a r a t u s of dissent ? 
Amiya Kumar Bagchi 
1. Contextual political economy and its rat ionale 
The discipline that studies the material aspects of man's 
(woman's) well-being has gone through at least three transformations. It 
emerged between the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century 
Europe as a systematic study of the state and society dealing with the 
economic aspects of statecraft or social stability (or in some cases, so-
cial revolution). During this period, most authors dealing with political 
economy were continually referring to their political and social con-
cerns or, their ideological stances, often in the guise of tneological dis-
putations. This often detracted from their analytical sharpness, but also 
rendered their discourse dense in the sense that the picture of the state 
or polity whose material condition was being analysed emerged as a liv-
ing entity, and not as an indistinct sketch on tracing paper. 
At the next transformation there occurred an apotheosis of Adam 
Smith's Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776/1911) an apotheosis which ei-
ther ignored the historical chapters of the book or which froze that his-
tory as the triumph of good over evil, or of laissez faire over govern-
ment interv ention. The real history behind Smith's demonology of what 
he dubbed as 'mercantilism' and the philosophical or political concerns 
of Jhe Scottish sage were shut out of the concern of mainstream politi-
cal economy. David Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy {Ricardo, 
1820/1951) perhaps represented this abstraction in its purest form : the 
only politics or society Ricardo was concerned with was the politics and 
society of the England of his times. It was his achievement but also his 
doubtful gift to posterity to make political economists forget that other 
societies had other political concerns and other structures. 
The final transformation in what has become the mainstream 
d i s c i p l i n e of economics was to black out even the shadow of the politi-
cal and the social, and foreground only what is called 'purely economic' 
in its discursive practice. This is the view of the discipline that has been 
enshrined in Schumpeter's History of Economic Analysis (Schumpter, 
1954). Part of the motivation of writing this paper lies in my view that 
the time has come now to entomb this view, and resurrect political 
economy in the spirit of its first incarnation - an incarnation which I will 
dub 'historical political economy' or c o n t e x t u a l political economy'. 
The programme that I have just put a name to was perhaps initi-
ated by Marx in his unfinished Theories of Surplus Value (Marx, 1960-
1971), but it was never executed seriously by later Marxists, at least in 
the English-speaking world. Ronald Meek and Maurice Dobb made in-
teresting and important contributions to the execution of this programme, 
but both were hamstrung by the view that the only writings that mattered 
were the writings of the great political economists of their time such as 
Francois Quesnay, Adam Smith or David Ricardo. This view pervades, 
for example, Dobb's Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam 
Smith (Dobb, 1973). The only chapter in the book which is an exception 
to my charge is that on The Reaction against Ricardo'. Even there the 
reader misses the picture of turbulence in England that made Ricardo 
such a bugbear to a large section of the ruling classes and their spokes-
men. 
The kind of transformation in the view of the discipline of po-
litical economy that I have put forward has already made great strides in 
the related discipline of political and social theoiy, thanks to the path-
breaking contributions of J.G.A. Pocock, John Dunn and Quentin Skin-
ner (Pocock, 1957, 1975; Dunn, 1969; Skinner, 1978). The full laying 
out of this revolution in method is too large a task to be attempted here. 
But the shortest signpost is perhaps that of the Cambridge University 
Press series, 'Ideas in context'. By 'context' is meant not only that of 
the historical background broadly conceived, but also the context of other 
texts of the time, and by extension, the context of all other relevant in-
stitutions. It is recognized in the analysis that the meaning of a word 
or a phrase depends on who are using it and when, and a fortiori, the 
3 
meanings of statements change with the way they fit into other state-
ments of the same speakers or of other speakers. The explication of the 
context of ideas involves laying bare the intentions of the speakers and 
the actors and the social and political processes which defeat, consum-
mate or transform those intentions and often produce unexpected re-
sults. (Some of the central statements of the method and its limitations, 
by Quantin Skinner and his critics, occur in Tully, 1988). 
Before we turn to the motivation of the particular exercise in 
contextual political economy attempted here, let me point out that the 
resurrection of the discipline in this form is not inspired by only the 
desire to retrieve meanings in history. It is also inspired by my percep-
tion that the actual process of economic change has been obscured by 
the myopic privileging of the analytical method of their own times by 
the general nin of economists. I will here cite two celebrated examples. 
The quantity theory of money was formulated in a crude form by Jean 
Bodin, in the sixteenth century, reformulated in the seventeenth century 
by John Locke, and became part of the common sense of political 
economy, long before algebraic expressions for it were provided by Irv-
ing Fisher, D.H. RDbertson, and John Maynard Keynes. Its reformtila-
tion in a more sophisticated form by Milton Friedman carried enough 
conviction in the period when Keynesian economics came under a cloud 
in Britain and the USA for it to become the official orthodoxy of central 
bankers and the Washington twins (the IMF and the World Bank). Is it 
possible to claim that the more sophisticated form of quantity theory 
did more good than the cruder form in influencing public policy before 
it was found out (as Mr Banbury was, in Oscar Wilde's Importance of 
Being Earnest)? It will take a brave soul to make such a claim. Or take 
another example. David Hume's specie-flow-price mechanism, put for-
ward by him originally in 1752 (Hume, 1752), was supposed to explain 
the working of the automatic gold standard till 1914 at least. It was then 
found that it was anything but automatic, and that the sequence of devel-
opment rarely conformed to the mechanism laid out by the philosopher 
whose scepticism still allowed a strange kind of determinism in human 
affairs. Then came Samuelson who claimed very recently that nobody 
had proved earlier that Hume's mechanism could have worked anyway 
Finally, I put forward the case of a dynamic theory of interna-
tional trade and the silence virtually all histories of economic thought 
regarding it as a major example of the hiatus in our thinking created by 
the peculiarly narrow view of political economy ensconced in the cur-
rent paradigm of academic economics. Josiah Tucker, a major pioneer 
of such a dynamic theory, is mentioned only once in Roll's History of 
Economic Thought, and that also as witness to the mobility of labour in 
his day (Roll, 1954, p.98). Schumpeter refers to him (Schumpeter, 1954, 
pp.226. 245, 375) but does not discuss any of his ideas separately and 
Blaug (1985) ignores him altogether. Viner's erudite tome refers to 
Tucker several times but there is only an oblique reference to the dy-
namical structure of the Dean's trade theory in the context of infant in-
dustry argument (Viner, 1937, pp.71-2). There is only one full-length 
book on Tucker in English (Shelton, 1981), but I have not found any ref-
erence to it in the work of practising economists (there is a reference 
though, in Pocock, 1985a). Yet as I hope to show, Tucker is worth study-
ing*on his own, for tying together a member of ideas which a few twenti-
eth century writers painfully rediscovered. These latter also were for a 
long time treated as mavericks. The resurgence of dynamic theories of 
international trade and growth and the search for firm theoretical foun-
dations of markets, whfch have come to be recognized as social institu-
tions rather than disembodied algebraic symbols manipulate at will, have 
lent new importance to historical or contextual political economy. When 
major investment decisions are recognized as irreversible, and develop-
ment is known to be path-dependent, history and real time enter inte-
grally into theories of economic change. 
Contextual political economy can also illuminate the develop-
ment of different discourses of history. The key figures of Josiah Tucker, 
David Hume and Edmund Burke can be seen to be standing at a confluence 
of Whig historiography with a historicist bent, Tory historiography with 
an acceptance of free market as the best method of conserving old insti-
tutions, and a radical historiography whose idiom is conservative and 
organicist. Burke can be read as a revolutionary who wanted just that 
kind of social change which would preserve old values or as a conserva-
tive who resisted change but knew that certain changes were caused by 
deep historical forces and therefore the wise course was to see that the 
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changes wrought least damage to the texture of society. While making 
these summary' statements. I am aware that I am dealing with writers whose 
discourses were of awesome complexity. But the point has to be made 
that European historiographies and nuimetic or resistant historiographies 
m ex-colonial countries have a long ancestry, and that the genetic pool 
of that ancestry is to be sought not in traditional-style histories alone 
but also in discourses on contemporary developments (though it must 
be noted that Hume wrote a history of England, the only book of his 
which was a resounding commercial success). Semmel (1970) has al-
ready shown how relevant Tucker's writings are in the theory of the 
socalled anti-imperialism of free trade. But they can be seen also as an 
explanation of how dominance over a foreign land can be achieved with-
out resorting to direct rule. As such they may also be relevant in under-
standing the strucmre of power in a world dominated by a bunch of wealthy 
capitalist nations. 
2. Political economy as the mas t e r d iscourse of capital ist 
governance 
The first chair of political economy in the English-speaking 
world was created by the East India Company for its officials who would 
be sent to India and was held by Thomas Robert Malthus (Keynes, 1951, 
p.9I).' This investiture at once institutionalized two contradictory ten-
dencies of the new academic discipline of political economy. On the 
one hand, Malthus' appointment symbolized the recognition of political 
economy as one of the dominant discourses of British colonial rule over 
India. On the other hand, Malthus represented the resistance of the los-
ing segment of the British ruling classes to the newly-emerging ortho-
doxy of Ricardian political economy. 
The incumbency of Malthus in the chair of political economy 
instituted by the East India Company for the instruction ofthe Company's 
senior officers in India, also symbolized the silence or the obfuscation 
of ground reality with slogans that marked much of the British official 
discourse regarding India. In most of his writings, Malthus had virtually 
nothing to say about India. On the other hand, the Malthus-Ricardo theory 
of differential rent was repeatedly invoked by British Indian officials to 
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j rnufy the land tax policies favoured by them even though the Indian 
c o u n t s , d e fulfilled virtually none of the conditions of the c a p S 
agriculture for which that theoiy had been designed (Amb,ra,a„ 978 
Barber 975; Stokes. 1959). Indeed, Ma.hus' successor a, S y b u r ! ' 
Richard Jones, composed his major book as a critique of cla ical Z ' 
meal economy as applied to India and other 'Oriental' countrie (Jone! 
1831; Barber, 197,). But this dissidence found very little resonance 
either m actual British policy towards India or its d . L u r s e o r T l 
writings of later historians of political economy, except of cour e he 
o f a , i - n a m e i y ' K a r i , 
he discourse of pel,tied economy from that of the d . s c o u r s ^ o f ^ cf 
Glorious Revolution and that became the corners,one o f X , cl ss 
b' l e '/Ste y S T T T ~ $ """ ^ 
debates as being bound i ™ i S o f the older 
VOU, Book IV) and £ l ^ T E ^ S 
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and Taxation demonstrated that it was possible to challenge the Com 
Laws and'expound the principles of working of a pure capitalist system 
without questioning existing Parliamentary or political arrangements. 
With that demonstration, the separation of political economy from its 
sisters and cousins, and its apotheosis as a master discourse became 
settled facts, at least until the Chartists and Parliamentary reform upset 
the near-consensus on these matters. The alleged decline of Ricardian 
economics in Britain in political circles did not displace political 
economy from the status of master discourse. John Stuart Mill pro-
vided a bridge between the world of Ricardian class conflict and the vir-
tues of natural price, and the world of marginal utility and market prices 
as the only arbiters of human destiny. The rise of political economy as 
master discourse in Britain was the outcome of the view of upper class 
Britons that the oligarchy consolidated under Sir Robert Walpole and 
his successors had proved to be beneficial to the growth of agriculture, 
commerce and manufactures in England. The only major items that re-
mained to be debated, at least until the disturbances of the period of the 
Napoleonic wars were the extent to which sectional interests should be 
sacrificed for the sake of commercial prosperity for the nation as a whole 
and the degree of concern that was to be shown regarding the growth of 
poverty among the displaced artisans and peasantry. That freer trade, if 
no/'free, trade, was the only hiah road to prosperity was agreed to by 
-Jftr . 
virtually all participants in the debate. 
3. F ree r t r a d e wi thout empire 
The ease with which a private British company was able to con-
quer practically the whole of the Indian subcontinent within a period of 
little more than sixty years (from the battle of Plassey (1757) to the 
battle of Mahidpur (1817) which saw the final subjugation of the Peshwa 
and the Maratha confederacy) has been attributed to the devastation caused 
by the wars attendant on the decline and fall of the Mughal empire (see, 
for example, Goetz, 1938; or Majumdar, Raychaudhuri and Datta, 1978, 
Book II, chapter V). 
Looking at Europe of the eighteenth century, it i^  difficult to 
believe that it was any less a cockpit of warring groups than post-Mughal 
India. Jonathan Swift in Part IV of Gullivers Travels. 'A voyage to the 
country of the Houyhnhnms' (originally published in 1726) had 
characterised the numerous ways in which war originated in Europe. Some 
of his descriptions are almost prophetic of the way India was conquered 
by the East India Company : 
It is justifiable to enter into a war against our nearest ally, when 
one o f his towns lie convenient for us, or territory o f land, that 
would render our dominions round and compact. If a prince 
sends forces into a nation, where the people are poor and igno-
rant, he may lawfully put half o f them to death and make slaves 
o f the rest, in order to civilize and reduce them from their bar-
barous way of living. It is very kingly, honorable, and frequent 
practice, when one prince desires the assistance o f another to 
secure him against an invasion, that the assistant, when he hath 
driven out the invader should seize on the dominion himself, and 
kill, imprison or banish the prince he came to relieve (Swift, 
1956, p.262). 
McNeill (1983) is not alone in arguing that it is the fissiparousness.and 
belligerence of the European state system that was one of the motive 
forces behind the advance of military technology and its diffusion into 
superior civilian technology—developments that allowed European mer-
chants and European arms to conquer the rest of the world (see also 
Brewer, 1989; and Parker, 1988). 
The establishment and consolidation of the Whig oligarchy in 
Britain under Sir Robert Walpole had been preceded by the expansion of 
the standing army and its bureaucratic rationalization under the leader-
ship of William of Orange (McNeill, 1983, chapter 4 and Parker, 1988, 
chapter 4). The Hanoverian succession began with several decades of 
peace, but the Seven Years' War (1756-63) was to be the harbinger of a 
new era of belligerency among the European powers, extending over-
seas to the American War of Independence, and the struggle for mastery 
in India. However, this was also the era of a financial revolution: the 
state was now able to mobilize public credit on a sustained basis without 
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running into bankruptcy. This led to further extension of landlord and 
rentier influence on British politics. The eighteenth century also witnessed 
the spread of the idea that luxury and polite manners rather than the nide 
barbarism of a Spartan soldier were marks of civilization; and of the idea 
that a continual movement towards freer trade was the high road to pros-
perity (Dickson, 1967; Hill, 1977, Part Three, chapters 4 - 6, and Part IV, 
chapter 1; Hirschman, 1976; and Pocock, 1985, Part III). How far the gentry 
or the ruling classes lived up to the ideals of gentility, or polite manners is 
another question altogether. In recent times, Herbert Butterfield, E.P. Th-
ompson and many other historians following them have adopted a scepti-
cal attitude towards the virtues of the gentry oligarchy (Butterfield, 1944; 
Hay etal. 1977; Thompson, 1977,1991) but the ideal remained as an impor-
tant constituent of the general ruling class ideology of the eighteenth 
century. 
In the 1750s, Britain had already become an empire, with colonial 
possessions in Ireland, in North America and in the Caribbean islands, 
and in scattered pockets or enclaves in other parts of the world. There 
were celebrants enough among the ranks of Britisl\politicians and writers 
of the imperial expansion of Britain or more narrowly, England. Not only 
East India merchants such as Sir Josiah Child or West Indian traders, but 
poets as different as Alexander Pope and Thomas Gray have been read as 
expressing the Spirit of England as the queen of the seas in their endeavours 
or their writings (Barrell, 1983; Kaul, 1992, chapter IV). However, there 
were many publicists whether Tory, Old Whig, True Whig or plain Whig 
in domestic politics who still considered colonial possessions as unnec-
essary and in many cases, a positive hindrance to domestic prosperity. 
4. The British eighteenth-century proponents of colonial con-
quest 
In a recent essay, Pocock has commented on the contrasting 
styles of conservatism of two very different personalities, namely, Josiah 
Tucker and Edmund Burke, who, however, both supported the indepen-
dence ofthe thirteen American colonies in 1776 (Pocock, 1985b). 
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Tucker and Burke can also be seen as opponents of conquest for the sake 
of commercial prosperity of the conquering nation, although in the case of 
the Irish Burke, the economic and political damage suffered by the con-
quered country also figured prominently among the reasons for his oppo-
sition to arbitraiy and authoritarian rule over a colony. 
Edmund Burke, and slightly later, James Maitland, the Eighth Earl 
of Lauderdale, both opposed the system of rule instituted by the East 
India Company in India. They should be seen as part of the tradition 
which regarded a political dependency as an irrelevance or a hindrance to 
the good government of England by men of property engaged in the legiti-
mate pursuit of profit through unshackled commerce. This contestation of 
colonial conquest became much more muted among British Indian rulers 
and their spokesmen after the British attained unquestioned ascendancy 
over the subcontinent of India. If Josiah Tucker can be taken as a spokes-
man of rich country dominance without empire, James Mill's writings mark 
the apogee of the opinion that affluence through civilized commerce is 
itself a justification of rule over nations which are more unfortunately 
situated. Almost coincidentally, the first edition of Mill's History of Brit-
ish India, which became a major landmark in the apologetics for British 
rule in India, was written in 1817 — the same year that saw the publication 
of the first edition of Ricardo's Principles and the final subjugation of the 
Maratha confederacy by the British. 
Josiah Tucker, the Dean of Gloucester, was engaged in a contro-
versy with a much more famous contemporaiy, viz., David Hume, regard-
ing the nature and duration of the advantages a rich country enjoyed over 
its poorer trading partners, a controversy that has been reviewed on sev-
eral occasions by historians of political economy (Hume, 1752a and 1752b; 
Tucker, 1774, Tract I; Viner, 1937, pp.84-7; Semmel, 1970, pp. 16-18; and 
Hont, 1983). A full treatment of the controversy would still require a new 
essay, however. In 1752, Hume outlined his classic specie-flow-price mecha-
nism for bringing about equilibrium in an economy which experienced a 
surplus (deficit) in its balance of trade and hence an influx (outflow) of an 
internationally accepted medium of exchange — gold or silver bullion or 
coins, in his particular case. He sought to demonstrate that, all other 
things remaining the same, an inflow of money in 
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the form of gold or silver would not permanently allow the country to 
retain a surplus in its trade balance with foreign countries or to remain 
permanently richer to the extent of the initial surplus accrued. 
Hume used phrases in his 'Balance of trade' essay which sug-
gested that a rich countiy might be inevitably impoverished in free compe-
tition with poorer nations, with lower wages and hence lower costs. His 
essay, 'Of money', however, could be read to mean that what would hap-
pen is that certain kinds of manufactures requiring a relatively low level of 
skills and abundant labour would migrate to the poorer country. In a world 
where technology' was all the time generating more skill-intensive indus-
tries, there would be a progressive diversification of economic activities. 
As a result, the richer countries would move up the product spectrum and 
the poorer country would produce the products the richer country ceased 
producing. In this process, the gap between the rich country and its poor 
trading partner would persist: it might progressively diminish, remain 
constant or even widen, depending on the way product differentiation 
and productivity differentials evolved over time. But there need be no 
presumption that the richer country would necessarily be brought down 
to the level of the poorer country. In any case, even if the productivity gap 
between the two countries diminished, they would grow richer together in 
the process. 
Neither Hume nor his critics in this debate fully outlined such a 
process, although Hume and later on, Tucker, came close to it (Hont, 1983, 
pp.274-5; Tucker, 1774, pp.28-46). One reason was that the theory of ad-
justment of balance of payments in two growing money-using economies 
was not spelled out even in a rudimentary form until the twentieth centuiy. 
The second reason was that the theory of international trade under static 
or dynamic economies of scale was not worked out until the 1970s and 
1980s (Samuelson, 1980, Jones and Kenen, 1984 and Helpman and Krugman, 
1985; Bagchi, 1992a). 
5. Tucker's dynamic theory of international t r a d e 
However, Tucker can be regarded as one of the precursors of the 
argument that early specialization in manufactures and the conse-
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quent tendency for productivity to rise all the time confers a more or less 
permanent advantage on a wealthy country endowed with manufactures 
as against a poor country, specializing in the production of raw materials 
and agricultural products. He can also be credited with formulating many 
of the ideas of cummulative advantage that were advanced by Gunnar 
Myrdal (1957) and Nicholas Kaldor (1972) from the 1950s on Tucker 
distinguishes between the case where a country gains a once-for-all wind-
fall (Tucker, 1774, pp.22-28) and the case in which the richer country ac-
quires wealth in the way of general industry. In the former case the wind-
fall will simply raise wages and costs all around in the country concerned 
and gradually it will lose its trade to its poorer neighbours and come back 
to the same level of earnings which it had before it experienced the wind-
fall. In the second case, the richer countiy or region would continue to 
retain its initial advantages for the following reasons (the orthography has 
been modernised in all quotations from eighteenth^entuiy authors): 
First, it would be more productive because it would be endowed 
with better implements, better infrastructure, a more extended and more 
intensive trading network, and a better or more productive agriculture 
(Ibid, p. 30). 
Secondly, the richer country is better endowed with information 
and knowledge-generating capacity: 
the poorer country, however willing to learn, cannot be sup-
posed to be capable of making the same progress in learning 
with the nch, for want o f equal means o f instruction, equally 
good models and examples; and therefore, tho' both may be 
improving every day, yet the practical knowledge o f the poorer 
in agnculture and manufactures will always be found to keep 
at a respectful distance behind that o f the richer country ( Ib id . 
P 31) . 
Thirdly, 'the richer country, is not only more knowing, but is also 
more able than the other to make further improvements, by laying out large 
sums of money in the prosecution of the intended plan' (Ibid p 3 2 ) 
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Fourthly, 'the higher wages of the richer country, and the greater 
scope given for the exertion of genius, industry, and ambition, will natu-
rally determine a great many men of spirit and enterprise to forsake their 
own poor country, and settle in the richer; so that the one will always drain 
the other of the flower of its inhabitants....' (Ibid., pp, 52-3). 
Fifthly, 'in the richer country, where the demands are great and 
constant, every manufacture that requires various processes, and is com-
posed of different parts, is accordingly divided and subdivided into sepa-
rate and distinct branches; whereby each person becomes more expert 
and also more expeditious in the particular part assigned him'. (Ibid., 
pp.33-4). 
Sixthly, 'the richer country has the greater number of rival trades-
men, and those more quick and dexterous; the goods of such a country 
have not only the advantages arising from quickness and dexterity, but 
also will be afforded much the cheaper on account of the emulation of so 
many rivals and competitors'. (Ibid., p.34.). 
Seventhly, 'in the rich country, the superiority of the capital and 
the low interest of money, will insure the vending of all goods on the 
cheapest terms.' (Ibid., pp.34-5). 
Tucker ends up with a proposition which deserves to be cel-
ebrated as the Hume-Tucker law of economic development and interna-
tional prices (because Hume in his essay,'Of money'comes close to it): 
'... operose or complicated manufactures are cheapest in rich 
countries; and raw materials in poor ones. And, therefore, in 
proportion as any commodity approaches to one, or other of 
these extremes, in that proportion will it be found to be cheaper, 
or dearer, in a rich or a poor country' (Ibid., p.36). 
In his second and third reasons for the persistent advantage 
enjoyed by a rich country over a poor one, Tucker largely anticipated the 
modern knowledge — and technology — based theories of dynamic com-
parative advantage (cf. Krugman, 1979 and Helpman and Krugman, 1985). 
He also stresses one factor, the importance of competition among trad-
14 
k, 
ers and the density of trading networks in leading to low prices (partly, 
through a greater degree of utilisation of capacity) which has yet to re-
ceive adequate attention from economists (for exceptions, see Diamond 
1982; Baumol, Panzer and Willig, 1982; cf. also Rakshit,' 1993). He, of 
course, fully anticipates Adam Smith in stressing an increasing division of 
labour as a generator of technical progress. 
The only element in the construction of a theory of growth and 
international trade in a dynamic setting that Tucker misses out is static 
economies of scale, presumably because large-scale factories utilising pro-
cesses characterised by decreasing costs were yet to make their debut 
when he wrote his Tract. He also misses out the effect of migration of 
capital, presumably because again the international migration of produc-
tive capital (as against that of the funds of rentiers investing in govern-
ment bonds) had not yet assumed serious proportions. On the other side 
Josiah Tucker fully grasped the 'backwash effect' on the poorer country 
or region (to use a term coined by Myrdal) of the migration of the more 
productive segments of the labour force and entrepreneurs to the richer 
country (region). 
With such views about the major causes of economic growth and 
with the firm knowledge or belief that England was already the richest 
country in Christendom, if not the whole world, it would not have been 
surprising if Josiah Tucker had been a believer in free trade between na-
tions as the expedient policy for England. A country which already en-
joyed all the first-mover advantages enumerated by Tucker and the dy-
namic economies of scale resulting from them could simply go on prosper-
ing by conquering the markets for the 'operose' manufactures and leav-
ing the less advanced branches to her competitors. But in fact, while 
Tucker was a staunch opponent of monopolies, especially those created 
by privileges conferred on them by governments, he was not a believer in 
complete free trade between nations or countries. He was an advocate of 
free trade only in the sense that he believed in the right of anybody to 
engage in a trade or profession he chose to enter. Boat he was also an 
advocate of government inteivention for the protection of public 
good as against unbridled action of private interests, and he defined a 
good tax as one which tended 'to prevent idleness, check extravagance 
and promote industry'. (Schuyler, 1931, pp. 13-14). 
In his Instructions for Tra\>ellers (Tucker 1758/1931, p.252), for 
example, he \\Tote: 
... such infant manufactures, or raw materials, as promise to 
become hereafter o f general use and importance, ought to be 
reared and nursed during the weakness and difficulties o f their 
infant state, by public encouragements and national premi-
ums. But it doth by no means so clearly appear, that this 
nursing and supporting should be continued for ever. On the 
contrary, it seems more natural to conclude, that after a rea-
sonable course o f years, attempts ought to be made to wean 
this commercial child by gentle degrees, and not to suffer it to 
contract a lazy habit of leaning continually upon the leading 
strings. 
Apart from protection for promising infant industries and special 
measures to encourage exports, another area in which Tucker specifically 
supported a special system of taxes and exemptions (and redefinition of 
property rights) was the growing of timber for building ships. Ships were 
vitally necessary for the defence of England, and she was, according to 
Tucker, too dependent on Baltic countries for timber. On the other hand, 
the price mechanism as such would not conquer the myopia of owners of 
land. Hence regulatory measures would be needed to resolve the 
intergenerational conflict of interest (Tucker 1755/1931, pp. 117-124). 
A clue to his concern to promote industry through government 
regulation — not so much of trade, as of the wider social arrangements — 
may be found in his Brief Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages 
which respectively attend France and Great Britain with respect to Trade 
(Tucker, 1753) where he deplores 'the want of subordination in the lower 
;lass of people', in Great Britain as against the sobriety, frugality and 
aboriousness of 'the manufacturing poor' in France {Ibid., p.71). The 
concerns of political economy were as yet not decently distanced from the 
concerns for maintaining a hierarchical order in society, 
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especially in the deliberations of a staunch supporter of the oligarchy of 
his day that Tucker was. The same concern for the strength and long-term 
interests of Great Britain is shown in the detailed proposals Tucker made, 
as we have already noted, for subsidizing timber plantations in England 
(and taxing those landowners who refuse to obey government instruc-
tions) in order to free her from dependence on imported Umber for ship-
building (Tucker, 1755, pp. 117-124): his argument for not relying on price 
incentives alone was that 'he who plants, unless he begins very young, 
cannot expect to reap much benefit in his own person' {Ibid., p. 121). Tucker 
was quite explicit about the connection between the establishment of the 
Whig oligarchy and the freeing of domestic commerce from all restraint 
' .„ an Englishman, notwithstanding his boasted liberty, is in regard to 
commerce still not free : For, he is still in bondage, not to the Crown 
indeed, as formerly, but to his fellow-subjects; and we still want the Glori-
ous Revolution in the commercial system, which we have happily ob-
tained in the political' (Tucker, 1755, p. 135). Of couree, Tucker may have 
wanted to instruct the potential competitors of England even more than 
the British themselves, and his prescription for government action to pro-
mote industry may have been meant only for the laggards rather than the 
leaders in the international competitive race. But such a reading of his 
writings would be far-fetched. 
6. The theoretical basis of Tucker's opposition to colonial-
ism 
Tucker's opposition to war or colonial conquest as a means of 
advancing the economic prosperity of a nation was quite unambiguous 
In his most extensive treatise on political economy, the Elements of Com-
merce and Theory ofTaxes (Tucker, 1755, pp. 140-181) he launched a broad-
side against the policy of chartering companies with exclusive privileges 
in the area of foreign trade. One of the arguments he tackled was 'that 
exclusive Companies mre necessary in order to maintain forts, governors 
and soldiers along the coast; - otherwise these establishments must be 
supported at the public expense'(Tucker, 1755,p.l41). But Tucker asked, 
To what commercial uses are these forts to be applied? If 
they are in order to plant a colony, — then the having a few 
ports, without making further settlements, is only being at a 
17 
continual expense to answer no end. If they are to awe and 
bridle the natives, it would be difficult to shew, what advan-
tage can accrue to trade by insulting and disobliging the people 
you trade with. ... But perhaps it may be said, ports are 
necessary, in order to prevent other European nations from 
trade, if they have a mind to trade ? Do the English forts, for 
example, prevent the French, or the French the English from 
trading to India ? Not at all. Nay, those European nations 
which have not one fort, find the way to trade as well as 
others .... (ibid., p. 141). (Italics in the original). 
Tucker did not republish the Elements of Commerce after 1755. 
But all the evidence suggests that he did not change his mind regarding 
the uselessness of colonial conquest or exclusive monopolies with arms 
and forts at their command for supposed expansion of foreign trade or 
economic improvement of the nation.2 His basic argument was that war 
was unnecessarily costly, and was an impediment to trade, and that a 
country well-governed, and well-endowed with traders, manufacturers and 
a prosperous agriculture, will prosper along the path of peaceful trade with 
another country rather than by going to war with i t For, not only will the 
advantages of a rich country tell in the superior quality or lower prices of 
its wares but also it will gain more from trade with a populous and prosper-
ous country than by pillaging it and reducing it to poverty. In one of his 
last writings Tucker expressed his astonishment that a wealthy, commer-
cial nation such as England 'should entertain that fondness for war, and 
should espouse so many quarrels as the English have eagerly done for 
almost a half century past' (Tucker, 1781, p.524). 
7. Empire, tribute and governance 
The conquest of Bengal by the East India Company and the 
methods of administration adopted by its officers in India produced an 
enormous amount of dissent in the ranks of the disgruntled servants of 
the Company and later on in the ranks of the members of the Governor-
General's Council (Bolts, 1772; Dow, 1768-72; Dutt, 1906; Baneijea, 1928; 
Majumdar, Ray Chaudhuri andDutta, 1978, Part III, Book 1, chapter VIII; 
Sinha, 1965 and 1968; Guha, 1981). 
18 
The conquest of Bengal by the East India Company led the Par-
liament to assert its sovereign right by demanding a cut in the territorial 
revenues of Bengal by the Company. The monopolization of many items 
of trade by the Company's servants, the interference in the normal chan-
nels of trade by the Company and its servants, and the continual drain of 
bullion from Bengal to meet the demands of the Company, its servants and 
the Parliament resulted in the Company running huge accounting losses. 
An appeal to the Parliament for financial help succeeded but as a quid pro 
quo, the Parliament passed the Regulating Act in 1773 to bring the affairs 
of the East India Company's possessions in India under nominal Parlia-
mentary control. 
There were a series of Parliamentary enquiries into East India 
Company's affairs from the 1780s onward, which were prompted by spe-
cific complaints about the maladministration of Bengal or by application 
on behalf of the Company for renewal of its Charter. There were also 
books and tracts produced by the Company's officials or 'free merchants' 
in India, and by dissident politicians such as Lord Lauderdale. The lan-
guage and agenda of these enquiries were influenced by the rising fashion 
for political economy among the ruling circles. Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations (1776) or simply the name of Dr. Smith was invoked by the pro-
tagonists to support their case. Until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, criticism of the Company's rule, not just in its detail, but also in its 
totality,—as a 'system' in Lauderdale's characterization (Lauderdale, 1809) 
was quite normal among its reform-minded supporters as well as its avowed 
opponents. Such opposition to British rule as a system virtually disap-
peared from the discourse of the ruling classes after the legal abolition (in 
1813) of the East India Company's exclusive privileges in its trade with 
India. James Mill's History of British India (181") marked the end of 
dissent among ruling circles in Britain. Mill, the radical democrat in the 
context of Britain, proved to be more despotic in his intention than any 
Oriental Despot (a construct par.excellence of the eighteenth century) 
had ever been (for a short account of such construction, see Aronson, 
1946/1979). 
One of the most memorable documents on the East India 
Company's rule was the Ninth Report of the House of Commons, 25th 
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June, 1783 believed to have been mainly authored by Edmund Burke, on 
trie basis of the documents submitted to the Select Committee 'appointed 
to take mto consideration the state of the Administration of Justice in the 
Province of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and to report the same, as it shall 
appear to them, to the House; with their Observations thereupon and 
who were instructed to consider how the British Possessions in the'East 
nd.es may be held and governed with the greatest security and Advan-
tage to tins country; and by what Means the Happiness of the Native 
Inhabitants may be best promoted' (Burke, 1969, p. 1). Obviously, it was 
taken for granted that the last two objectives, viz. 'the greatest L u n t y 
and advantage to Britain and 'the happiness of the native inhabitants' 
could be reconciled within the same scheme of government. 
In one way or another Edmund Burke was practically engrossed 
m the affairs of the East India Company from the 1780s to almost the end 
of his life first, through his membership of the Select Committee of the 
House of Commons to enquire into East India Affairs, then through his 
espousal of the India Bills seeking to abolish the political authority of the 
Company and through his speeches before the House of Commons and 
finally before the House of Lords seeking the impeachment of Warren 
W i n g s the Governor General of Bengal from 1772 to 1785 (Marshall 
1965; and 1991)3. While the Ninth Report embodies B u r k e ' s " s 
associates ) idea of how pnnciples of political economy would inform 
he good governance of the East India Company's possessions in India 
the proceedings connected with the impeachment of Hastings illuminate 
what was considered to be inadmissible behaviour on the part of a su-
preme governor acting under the authority of the British Parliament 
8. Toleration of religion and custom as a foundation of good 
governance 
The Ninth Report and Burke's speeches reaffirm 
certain guidelines for governing the British-occupied territories in India 
One cardinal principle of this was non-interference with the religious 
behefs o f - h e people and respect for the customs of the country To the 
extent to which they did not interfere with the Company's continued oc-
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cupation of the territories under its control (Mar shall, 1965, 'Conclu-
sion' and Marshall, 1970). According to Nathaniel Halhed, one of the 
first translators of Hindu religious regulations, nothing could conduce 
more to protect the stability of the Company's acquisitions in India or 
'conciliate the affections of the natives', 'as a well-timed toleration in 
matters of religion, and an adoption of such original institutes of the 
country, as do not immediately clash with the laws or interests of the 
conquerors' (Halhed, 1776. p. 142). The translation of the Hindu reli-
gious regulations was carried out by Halhed with the encouragement and 
active support of Warren Hastings, who forwarded it to the Court of Di-
rectors of the East India Company (Rocher, 198." -;mpter4). Hastings 
was himself a considerable scholar (by the standard of those days) of 
Indian lore and Indian languages. On the other hand, one of the standards 
by which Burke wanted Hastings to be judged was whether the latter had 
violated the 'laws, rights, usages, institutions' of Indians (Marshall, 1965, 
p.XIII). Most of the protagonists in the debate on India in fact accepted 
the desirability of respecting the social institutions of India, in so far as, 
of course, they did not interfere with the protection of the Company's 
acquisitions. 
There were, however, reformers who wanted to revolutionize 
the Indian institutions so as to make them better conform to the derriands 
of private property rights and free trade : (see, in this connection,-Guha, 
1981). This attitude has been generally seen as simply a matter of expe-
diency. But, in fact, this would have been an attitude typical of a member 
of the upper classes in Britain —especially one who found the existing 
political arrangements pretty well-ordered, except for a few blemishes 
here and there. Religious toleration, while still not receiving a legal 
embodiment in all respects became a settled matter of social policy and 
normal political practice over the century after the Settlement of 1688 
(Hill, 1971; Corrigan and Sayer, 1985, chapters 4 and 5). Private prop-
erty, especially in land, remained the bedrock of social and political power 
in eighteenth century England and Burke was quite explicit in support of 
that social order (Macpherson, 1980; chapter 5). 
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9. Burke's assumptions regarding the nature of Indian society 
and applicability of English laws 
Burke's assumption was that Indian society was characterized, 
like European society, by 'property moveable and immoveable, 
descendible property as well as occasional property held for life (quoted 
by Marshall, 1965. p. 183). Hence he found it natural to apply to its gov-
ernance principles which he also upheld as an active politician in the 
British Parliament. In the Ninth Report, which served as a justification 
for the India Bills introduced by the coalition government of the 
Rockingham Whigs and Lord North, Burke (speaking as the acknowl-
edged author of the Report) pointed out the grave departures from the 
requirements of justice that were permitted by the Regulating Act of 
1773. First, the supreme body of the East India Company, viz., the Court 
of Directors was elected by the Court of Proprietors, and the latter would 
easily come to be dominated by corrupt sen ants or associates of the 
Company and thus "the delinquent servants of the Company' who might 
have.to be brought to book before the Court of Directors could easily 
become .'their own judges (Burke, 1783, p.200). Burke's concern for 
good,government of India was intimately connected with his general 
concern to minimize the corruption arising out of the patronage of the 
royal court in Britain. Extending this fight against corruption to the East 
India Company's possessions, he wrote, 'it is cabal and corruption, rather 
than disorder and confusion, that were most to be dreaded in transacting 
the affairs of India' {Ibid., p.201). 
Coming to another important part of the provisions of the 1773 
Act, Burke thought that the Supreme Court set up under it was 'operose 
and extensive' (Ibid., p.204). The Select Committee was unable to find 
one single leading instance of relief given by that Court 'to the natives 
against the corruptions or oppression of British subjects in power' (Ibid ). 
On the other hand, there was 'a very strong marked instance of the judges 
having employed an unwarrantable extension or application of the mu-
nicipal law of England' (Ibid.). This was the trial and execution of Maha-
raja Nandakumar on a charge of forgery, a crime which was a capital 
offence under the draconian laws for protecting property in eighteenth 
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century England (Hay et al. 1977 and Thompson, 1977) but definitely 
not in India under the pre-British laws. 
The 1773 Act also set up the Council General to supervise the 
operations of all the three Presidencies into which the East India 
Company's Indian administration was divided. The Governor in Bengal, 
with the new designation of Governor General became head of the Coun-
cil, with four other Councillors as members. Members of the Council 
were forbidden trade and the taking of presents, and a right of prosecu-
tion in the King's Bench for violations of their powers was provided in 
the Act. However, 'nothing was done to prevent complaint from being 
far more dangerous to the sufferer than injustice to the oppressor. No 
overt acts were fixed, upon which corruption should be presumed in trans-
actions, of which secrecy and collusion formed the very basis; no rules of 
evidence, no authentic mode of transmission were settled in conformity 
to the unalterable circumstances of the country and the people'. (Burke, 
1783, p.208). 
But in trying to nail down Hastings' crimes or fixing responsi-
bility for the alleged maladministration by the other officials of the Com-
pany in India, Burke came up against several serious conceptual prob-
lems which have not always been recognized by later commentators. First, 
in days without steamboats or the telegraph, trying to regulate the 
Company's affairs from Britain in any but the grossest manner, while 
allowing the Company to retain its privileges and imposing on it a duty to 
act as the bailiff of the Parliament to raise a tribute in India, was almost a 
hopeless task. The Governor General and his Council must be given 
enough leeway to judge the situation by themselves and act locally. Their 
authority must be rather 'ill-defined'; how could they be prevented from 
giving construction to that authority 'which' the Ninth Report alleged 
•rendered them perfectly despotic'? (Ibid., p.207). As the same Report 
pointed out, if such constructions were allowed, 'no action of theirs ought 
to be regarded as criminal' (Ibid.). 
As the outcome of the attempt to impeach Warren Hastings dem-
onstrated, this is exactly what happened. Despotism and arbitrariness 
were inherent in the administration of a private corporation which was 
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allowed, or even enjoined, to increase the profits of the proprietors and,; 
the share of the Parliament in those profits through acts abridging th*n 
liberty-ofiforeigners wherever it was considered expedient to do so. How., 
was the- legality of action of the servants of the Company to be defined 
when the concept of legality suffered from a number of problems? First, 
it was not at all clear which laws — the laws of previous regimes in India 
or the laws passed by the British Parliament or the common law of En-
gland as interpreted in the Courts — should prevail when conflicts arose 
between them. Secondly, in many cases, Indian laws were themselves 
not defined in the sense in which definition was understood by British 
administrators or jurists. They were not always neatly codified. They 
depended considerably on oral evidence, local usage and contextual in-
terpretation. Their orality and contextuality came up against the faith in 
the written word displayed by the 'writers' of the Company (it is not for 
nothing that the seat of the Company's government in Calcutta came*o 
be known as Writers' Building). Rigid definition in a written form was 
also, however, demanded by the mercantile pursuits of the Company and 
by the attempt to enforce accountability at a distance for both mercantile 
and non-mercantile decisions. Thirdly, the Company's administration 
set up a centralized bureaucracy in a country of vast distances with a 
considerable diffusion of administrative, judicial and disciplinary powers 
among local magnates. That attempt itself was bound to disturb many 
local usages, customs and laws. As Colebrooke and Lambert (1795) were 
to complain later, not enough courts were set up by the Company for 
ordinary people to have access to those seats of justice. 
Finally, of course, there was the supreme irony that most of the 
members of the ruling class in Britain — belonging to the country or 
Court party, calling themselves old Whigs, True Whigs, plain Whigs, 
Rockingham Whigs, or Tories — believed in the inalienable right of prop-
erty-holders to govern themselves and the realm in the interest of private 
property. And here was a Company which was riding roughshod over 
many of the private property rights of landholders and others in Bengal 
and denying all political right to the propertyholders and a fortiori to the 
rest of the populace. Burke was beginning to be interested in Indian 
affairs a* .g^actly the time when the British Parliament was getting ready 
to accept the fact that the thirteen American colonies would shake 
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oiTflny pretence of rule by the Parliament. Burke, along with Josiah Tucker, 
Adam Smith and a whole lot of political economists and Whig politicians 
in general, basically supported the Americans against George III and the 
Tory administration in this historic conflict. A major slogan of the Ameri-
can revolutionaries was, 'No taxation without representation': At no stage 
did Burke or any other critic of the mode of operation of the East India 
Company in India suggest that Indians should any way be represented in 
the British Parliament or that the Parliament should even hear Indian evi-
dence. Those who denied the Indians any concept or practice of private 
property or any claim to consideration as landed proprietors were in some 
ways more consistent than men like Burke who found so many similari-
ties between Indian and European societies and analysed the violation of 
the basic tenets of political economy and yet could not think of a totally 
different system of government for India. The 1783 India Bill put for-
ward by the Coalition government of which Burke was a member would, 
at best, only have substituted the officials appointed by the British Parlia-
ment for the East India Company's servants as the despots of India. 
10. Burke's analysis of the macroeconomics of plunder 
The critique of the East India Company's policy contained in 
the Ninth Report can be divided into the macroeconomic and monetary 
aspects and the microeconomic and sectoral aspects. The opening sec-
tion of the Report is devoted to the political aspects of governance of the 
Company. The following three sections, including the section on the 
internal trade of Bengal, are devoted to the macroeconomic aspects, in-
cluding the influence of the disarray of the normal external and internal 
trade of Bengal on the external economic relations of the Company. The 
rest of the Report, up to the penultimate section, discussed the 
sectoral problems of silk and cotton textiles, opium, salt and saltpetre — 
commodities which formed the major part of the 'investment' of 
the Company. We have to understand that 'investment' in this 
context is exactly the opposite of what the word has come to mean in 
the usual parlance of economics : 'investment' by the Company 
meant the extraction of certain major commodities from Bengal 
as part of the tribute of the Company and heir sale in European 
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markets. The Ninth Report details how this perversion of the normal 
meaning of the word came about in the East India Company's vocabulary 
and practice. 
Before the Company's army conquered the territory of Bengal 
and Bihar, its trade with that territory and with other parts of India gener-
ally produced a large balance in favour of India, and that had to be settled 
by exporting- treasure — mainly in the form of silver — from Europe. 
After the conquest of Bengal by the Company, and more specifically af-
ter its acquisition of Dewani, that is, the right to levy the annual land 
revenue in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in the name of the Mughal Emperor 
in Delhi, a portion of die revenues of the conquered territory was set aside 
for the purchase of goods to be exported to England on behalf of the 
Company and this was called 'The investment' (Burke, 1783, p.223). So 
'investment' became equivalent to the extraction of tribute. This was, as 
Burke emphasized, a new way of supplying the market by means of the 
British pflwer and influence' (Ibid.). Ironically enough 
T h e g r e a t n e s s o f this investment has been the standard by 
which the merit of the Company's principal servants has been 
too generally estimated; and this main cause o f the impover-
ishment o f India has been generally taken as a measure o f its 
wealth and prosperity' (Ibid ). 
As the fame of the fabulous wealth to be obtained by the new 
rulers of Bengal spread, the proprietors of the East India Company and 
the British government both wanted to profit by those riches : 
T h e s e t w o parties, after some struggle, came to an agreement 
to divide between them the profits, which their speculation 
proposed to realize in England from the territorial revenue in 
Bengal. About two hundred thousand pounds was added to 
the annual dividends o f the proprietors. Four hundred thou-
sand was given to the State; which, added to the old divi-
dend, brought a constant charge upon the mixed interest o f . 
Indian trade and revenue, o f eight hundred thousand pounds 
a year; this was to be provided for at all events (Ibid., p.224). 
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This new system of 'trade' caused enormous hardship to the 
Indians, and also to other European powers trading with India. Nothing 
was done to relieve the Indians. But apart from the fact that the local 
officials of the Company and the Court of Directors tried to devise ex-
pedients to help the European powers, the legal and illegal fortunes made 
by the British Company's servants provided the wherewithal for the other 
European powers to carry on their trade. The latter bought commodities 
in Bengal with the funds provided by the Company's servants and the 
export of those commodities became the means of remitting these for-
tunes, sometimes by devious routes, (such as through China and the 
Americas), to Britain. The British East India Company's trade, the trade 
of its servants or other private merchants and that of other European 
powers between India and China were also supported, at least partially, 
by the territorial revenues of Bengal. The upshot was, according to the 
Ninth. Report, that 
The whole exported produce o f the country [i.e. Bengal and 
Bihar - A.B ] (so far as the Company is concerned) is not ex-
changed in the course of barter; but is taken away without any 
return or payment whatsoever. In a commercial light, there-
fore, England became annually bankrupt to Bengal, to the amount 
nearly o f its whole dealing; or rather, the country has suffered 
what is tantamount to an annual plunder o f i t s manufacture and 
its produce to the value o f twelve hundred thousand pounds 
(Ibid, p.226). 
Moreover, as pointed out already, the royally chartered or mo-
nopoly companies from France, Holland and Denmark, instead of pro-
viding relief to India through legitimate commerce and competition with 
the British East India Company, added to the calamity, 'because the greater 
part of the capital of all these companies and perhaps the whole capital 
of some of them, is famished exactly as the British is, out of the rev-
enues of the country' (Ibid., p.227). 
All of this analysis was not wholly original. Sir James Steuart 
who was asked by the East India Company to devise a scheme of banking 
for Company's territories when the trade of those territories was already 
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suffering from tlie terrible shortage of an acceptable medium of exchange, 
had diagnosed some of the basic reasons (Steuart, 1772). The corre-
spondence of the sen-ants of the Company refers to many of the ele-
ments of Burkes analysis, which was indeed based largely on informa-
tion provided by that correspondence and by data supplied by his col-
laborators and informants, the chief of whom. Sir Philip Francis, had a 
deep knowledge of Indian affairs. Later commentators and economic 
historians provided more detailed estimates of the 'drain' or the 'plun-
der" during the period covered by Burke (see. for example. Colebrooke 
and Lambert, 1795). and some economic historians (e.g.. Sinha, 1927) 
tried to relate developments in the real economy to the developments in 
the area of the medium of circulation. However, the starkness and clar-
ity of the analysis of the process of impoverishment of Bengal through 
the mechanism of a regular transfer of a tribute abroad and through the 
exercise of despotic power by the Company's servants have never been 
surpassed by later analysts. 
11. The plunder of India and the threat of Nabobizat ion of 
British polities 
Burke (in the Ninth Report) was also concerned with the ma-
lign impact on domestic British politics of the perverse manner in which 
trade was conducted by the East India Company and its servants (Burke, 
1783, pp.231-43). This concern more or less disappeared from the later 
discourses on the political economy of British rule in India, making only 
a fleeting appearance in the discussion of eighteenth century British poli-
tics or of the developments leading to the abolition of the East India 
Company's exclusive privileges of trade with India (in 1813) and later, 
with China (Furber, 1951; Greenberg, 1951; Sutherland, 1952; Philips, 
1961; Marshall, 1965; Tripathi, 1979). 
The expedient of continually raising land revenue demands on 
the Company's territories and extorting larger and larger payments could 
not keep up the 'investment'. The Company then resorted to advances 
from its own Board of Trade in London, and also raised loans in the Lon-
don money market. But this expedient soon ceased to relieve the Com-
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pany. The Directors then allowed the servants of the Company to send 
goods on the Company ships, so as to try and realize a commission on 
them, although the Company legally enjoyed the sole monopoly of trade 
of Britain with all parts east of the Cape of Good Hope. Variations on this 
plan were made, and the Company's servants in London profited from 
commission on these transactions, besides their salaries. As Burke (1783, 
p.236) pointed out, through these transactions, 'the Company is totally 
overturned, and all its relations inverted'. From being a body concerned 
in trade on their own account, and employing their servants as factors, the 
servants turned the Company into their agent. 
With improvement in the finances of the Company through the 
recovery of Bengal from famine, through further conquests and through 
the reforms brought in by Lord Cornwallis, the inversion of the Company's 
relations with its servants was partially reversed. However, the influence 
of the fortunes made by the Company in Britain, and more indirectly, on 
those deliberations of the British Parliament which concerned the 
Company's administration lingered. One of the most notorious cases of 
such influence occurred when Paul Benfield, who had amassed a fortune 
by lending money to the Nawab of Arcot and supporting him in his at-
tempt to take over the territory of Tanjore, was able to buy m Parliamen-
tary seat. The Raja of Tanjore was re-installed for the duration by the 
Board of Control which was created by Pitt's India Act of 1784. Benfield 
nonetheless realized most of his ill-gotten fortune from India although he 
lost it all in later speculations. (Marshall, 1981a). Many other returned 
'Nabobs' were influential in the British Parliament in Burke's time. It is 
possible, however, that the reform of the East India Company's adminis-
tration severely limited the extent of illegal fortunes made in India after 
the 1780s, and<that the relative impoverishment of India under the 
Company's administration also led to a contraction of the base on which 
spectacular private fortunes could be made. With the tightening of Par-
liamentary control mechanisms the large private fortunes to be made in 
India was only substituted by the more systematic fiscalization of the 
tribute extracted from that country. With this development, the influence 
of the Indian connexion on British politics became diffused through the 
whole state apparatus and would no longer be localized in particular Par-
liamentary groups or politicians. 
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12. The microeconomic, and sectoral aspects of the coercive 
monopoly exercised by the Company and its servants 
A f t e r treating the effect of the tributary extractions of the Com-
pany on the Company's governance, Burke in the Ninth Report turneci to 
the domestic and sectoral aspects of the political economy of the 
Company's government in India. The Company had obtained a valuable 
privilege from the Mughal Emperor — that of trading within the country 
without paying most of the duties on internal trade. But their servants did 
not enjoy this privilege. After die conquest of Bengal, however, the Com-
pany officials began to behave as if they also enjoyed this privilege. This 
led to severe losses for the Nawab's treasury and put the Indian mer-
chants who had to pay the tolls at a serious disadvantage in competition 
with the Company and its servants. As Burke (1783, p.244) put it, the 
Company's 'servants ... followed their fortunes in the channels in which 
it had hitherto ran (sic), only enlargmg them with the enlargement of their 
power. For their first ideas of profit were not official; nor were their 
oppression those of ordinary despotism'. 
Mir Kasim, who was installed by the British as the Nawab of 
Bengal in place of their first puppet, Mir Jaffer, objected to this blatant 
abuse of the Company's privileges by its servants. Failing in his remon-
strance, he took a drastic step — that of abolishing all internal tolls. In 
Burke's words (Ibid., p.245) 'Never was a method of defeating the op-
pressions of monopoly more forcible, more simple or more equitable'. 
When the Company's servants in Calcutta failed to get the Nawab to change 
his ruling, they denied that he had the power to remit the duties and ulti-
mately deposed him after defeating him at the battle of Buxar. 
After this, the Company's servants simply did as they pleased. 
'The Company's servants, armed with authorities delegated from the nomi-
nal government, or attended with what was a stronger guard, the fame of 
their own power, appeared as magistrates in the markets in which they 
dealt as traders' (Ibid.). Some of the Company's senior servants tried to 
act as the public officials of a regular government, but their own self-
interest or self-interest of rivals within the establishment defeated their 
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aims. Lord Clive, appearing for the second time as Governor of Bengal, 
sought to regularize the de facto monopoly in most of the important ar-
ticles of internal trade by making it de jure. But after a /ime, his device 
was struck down by a decision of the Court of Directors. 
In the Ninth Report, Burke made an acute analysis of the injuri-
ous character of the monopoly exercised by a set of arbitrary rulers. He 
also pointed out the instability introduced by sudden changes from prin-
ciple to expediency and back : 'as the complaint of the country [i.e. Ben-
gal - A.B.] or as their own interest predominated, they [i.e. the Court of 
Directors of the Company or the Presidency of their senior officials in 
Calcutta - A.B.] were always shifting' from the course of benefiting the 
pecuniary interests of the Company or its servants, or acting according to 
the principle of a ruler, 'so that it became as impossibl e for the natives to 
know on what principle to ground any commercial sp .ulation, from the 
uncertainty of the law under which they acted, as w; ,en they were op-
pressed by power, without any colour of law at a l l ' (Burke, 1783, 
pp.246-7). 
The evils of the kind of monopolistic power exercised by the 
Dutch and the English East India Companies had already been expounded 
by Adam Smith whose work Burke is said to have admired (Pocock, 1982, 
p. 194). Smith ,1776, Vol.2, pp. 131-7; 233-42) had pointed to the essen-
tial conflict of interest between the Company as sovereign and the Com-
pany as merchant. 'It is in the interest of the East India Company, consid-
ered as sovereigns, that the European goods which are earned to their 
Indian dominions should be sold there as cheap as possible; and that the 
Indian goods which are brought from thence should bring there as good a 
price, or should be sold there as dear as possible. But the reverse of this is 
their interest as merchants. As sovereigns their interest is exactly the 
same as that of the country they govern. As merchants their interest is 
directly opposite to that interest' (Ibid., p. 134). 
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fli/rke's analysis in the Ninth Report was partly an elaboration 
of this theme. But it went beyond that in demonstrating the malign effect, 
on almost all branches of economic activity in which the Company or its 
servants might be interested, of the combination of state power and mer-
cantile interest in the same body of people. And his analysis revealed the 
further horror that the Company might cease to be merchants and yet its 
policies might work against the interest of the country it governed. Smith 
had not yet enough data on Bengal to go further than broad generaliza-
tions. But he drew on his knowledge of the government of the Dutch East 
India Company to extend his critique to the British policy in Bengal as 
well. In order to keep up prices of the produce of 'the spice lands' of 
Indonesia, the Dutch were 'said to burn all the spiceries which a fertile 
season produces beyond what they expect to dispose of in Europe with 
such a profit as they think sufficient'. (Ibid., p. 132). Through their wan-
ton destruction, the Dutch were also said to have reduced the populations 
of several islands to a point in which they were just sufficient to supply 
the provisions for the Dutch garrison or the occasional visiting ships. Smith 
then predicted gloomily : 'The English Company have not had time to 
establish in Bengal so perfectly destructive a system. The plan of their 
government, however, has had exactly the same tendency'. (Ibid.). 
Burke/o//owed Smith in his total distrust of the monopoly insti-
tuted by the East India Companies in India (or Indonesia). Smith's argu-
ment against the allegation that without monopoly, the prices of Indian 
goods in the British markets would go up through competition in the In-
dian market was a dynamic one : 'The increase in demand ... though in 
the beginning may sometimes raise the price of goods, never fails to lower 
it in the long run. It encourages production, and thereby increases the 
competition of the producers, who, in order to undersell one another, have 
recourse to new divisions of labour and new improvements of art which 
might never overwise have been thought of (Ibid., p.235). 
The Ninth Report also analysed the effects of the East India Com-
pany combining the functions of a trader and a ruler on its own fortunes 
and on those of the Indian traders and producers. This analysis is striking 
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because of (a) the distinction made between an ordinary monopoly and a 
coercive monopoly (Burke, 1783, p.252), (b) the delineation of the nu-
merous ways in which the Company's servants could convert the powers 
of the Company as a ruler into their own arbitrary power when trading 
with Indians, and (c) the clear recognition of the coercive depression of 
earnings of most Indian producers enmeshed in the trade of the European 
companies or their servants to levels of subsistence or even below those 
levels (Ibid., p.249). A coereive monopoly is distinguished from a mere 
monopoly by the fact that the monopolist can use state power or arbitrary 
power in addition to the usual instruments of the market place. 
When the trade in raw silk, which had until then been a preserve 
of the Company, was opened to the Company's servants, the price of it at 
once rose by eighty per cent. The explanation given was that the price 
paid by the Company to the producers had been arbitrary, and had been 
no more than 'what was judged sufficien//or the maintenance of the first 
producers' (Italics mine). The cultivators who produced the silk 'had the 
sufficiency of their maintenance measured out by the judgement of those 
who were to profit by their labour; and this measure was not a great deal 
more by their own account, than about two thirds of the value of that 
labour' (Burke, 1783, p.249). Burke recognized that whether the trade 
was legally monopolized by the Company or thrown open to the 
Company's servants as well, the cultivators would be in the same posi-
tion of'servitude' because of the despotic power exercised by the Com-
pany or its servants or their agents lower down (Ibid., p.252). 
Throughout the Ninth Report, Burke emphasized the multiple 
ways in which the power of the Company and its servants pervaded all 
dealings with Indians and converted an apparent freedom of trade into a 
condition of monopoly.- But, of course, the Company and its servants 
were intent on monopolizing any commodity which promised a large profit 
or a convenient means of remittance to England. In the case of silk the 
spirit of increasing the investment from revenue at any rate, and the reso-
lution of drivinw all competitors, Europeans or natives, out of the mar-
ket', prevailed in Madras also. The directors of the Company instructed 
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the presidency of Madras in 1768, to raise the prices'offered in areas 
where such a practice would deter competitors. But the presidency was 
directed to prohibit them 'from making up any cloth of the same sortments 
that are provided for us ....' (Ibid., p.255). With the same objects in view, 
the Company directors in 1769 recommended an advance on the prices of 
raw materials, and also, to 'prevent silk winders from working in their 
private houses, and to confine them to the Company's factories, where 
they would work for the Company's benefit', wanted an absolute prohi-
bition of their alternative employment to be promulgated, 'by the Au-
thority of Government' (Ibid., p.253). 
7wrning to the production of, and trade in cloth, the Ninth Re-
port cited numerous instances of the use of the authority of the state for 
the Company's profit and for the profit of its servants. When, for ex-
ample, on the complaint of John Cree, an English free merchant at Dacca 
(Dhaka, now capital of Bangladesh), George Hurst, the Commercial Chief 
of the Company in that town, was asked for an explanation of the seizure 
of goods and imprisonment of Cree's agents, Hurst did not deny that there 
were some instances of abuse of power. But he claimed that 'a single 
instance cannot be brought of a general depravity'. (Ibid., p.261). The 
Select Committee claimed that they had reason to believe that the 'coer-
cive measures' complained of had been 'very general, though employed, 
according to the degree of resistance to the monopoly' and that 'the whole 
trade of the Dutch' was at one time 'involved in the general servitude'. 
The Ninth Report the/7 laid bare the distinction between abuse of justifi-
able authority and the use of authority for an unjustifiable purpose : 
... it a p p e a r s very extraordinary that nothing but the actual proof o f a 
general practice would affect a practice, the very principle o f which 
tends to make the coercion as general as the trade. Mr. Hurst's reflec-
tion concerning the abuse of authority is jus/; but in this case it is alto-
gether inapplicable, because the complaint was not o f the abuse, but o f 
the use o f authority in matters o f trade which ought to have been free. 
(Ibid.). (Italics in the original) 
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13. The monetary consequences of the Company's plunder and 
coercive monopoly 
The ruin of Indian merchants caused by arbitrary monopoliza-
tion of virtually all external trade by the European Companies and their 
servants, and of any branches of internal trade the latter considered lu-
crative was compounded by the monetary aspect of the extraction of the 
tribute that the Ninth Report documented. The cessation of the import 
of silver into Bengal, accompanied by its export to China from the 1760s 
onward caused a severe shortage of coins in Bengal, and led to a liquidity 
crisis for all traders, but especially for Indians. 
Attempts to introduce an overvalued gold currency did not an-
swer either (Sinha, 1927, pp.59-60), when Warren Hastings was Gover-
nor, attempts were made to replace cowries (seashells imported from 
the Maldives) the main medium of exchange among the ordinary Indians, 
with copper coins (Ibid., pp. 145-6). But this did not succeed because 
there were not enough copper coins, and copper was overvalued in rela-
tion to cowries and silver. Experiments with the introduction of bank 
notes and use of European-style banks to carry out the remittance opera-
tions within the country also ended in failure (Ibid., p. 146). As Hume 
had already pointed out, a paper currency could not surv ive if a country 
ran an adverse balance of trade. The attempt by the British to export an 
'investment' out of India on a continuing basis had generated an adverse 
balance of trade even though the basic private balance was almost al-
ways in India's favour. 
Such monetary instability or rather long-term contraction in the 
monetary base almost certainly led to a contraction of total trade, and 
put into reverse gear whatever beneficial effects the more intimate trade 
connection between Europe and India might have otherwise had. The 
long-period demonetization and de-commercialization of many regions 
of India in the wake of British rule have not yet been adequately analysed, 
as the East India Company became more and more disengaged from in-
ternal trade, records of its dislocation became less frequent in official 
despatches. But complaints about the difficulty of making salaiy pay-
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meats or other disbursements out of the Company's treasuries contin-
ued to surface in official correspondence down to the 1810s (many such 
complaints from the Bengal district officials are cited by Chowdhury, 
1958: and Gupta, 1984). 
14. The need for protection of rights of Indian traders as well 
as producers 
Burke's scheme of political economy comprehended not just 
the freedom of trade as an abstract principle but the right of traders and 
producers to engage freely in the occupations that they had chosen and 
earn a reasonable profit or competence from them. This is demonstrated 
by the way in which he treated the cases of Indian traders who had earlier 
engaged in cloth trade and also acted as agents to the Company, and of 
cultivators of opium, a commodity whose production the Company came 
to control rigidly within its territories, often employing private Euro-
pean merchants for that purpose. 
The Company had engaged agents or Jalals at Dacca for the 
procurement of cloth, but ultimately threw them out, in the process us-
ing many coerciv e measures against the weavers. The Ninth Report com-
ments : 'It is remarkable that during the long and warm contest between 
the Company's agents and the dealers of Dacca, the Board of Trade seem 
to have taken a decided part against the latter. They allow some sort of 
justice in the complaints of the manufacturers with regard to low valua-
tion, and other particulars' (Ibid., p.262). But in another place they claim 
'that there is no ground for the dissatisfactions and difficulties of the 
weavers, "that they are owing to the Dalals, whose aim it is to be em-
ployed" ' (Ibid.). (Italics in the original). The Ninth Report comments : 
'This desire of being employed, and of rendering themselves necessary, 
in men whose only business it is to be employed in trade, is considered 
by the gentlemen of the Board as no trivial offence. ...' (Ibid ). 
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Turning to the authorized monopoly of opium the Ninth Report 
noted : 
The policy was justified on the usual principles on which mo-
nopolies are supported and on some peculiar to the commodi ty , 
to the nature o f the trade, and to the state o f the country the 
security against adulteration; the prevention o f the excess ive 
home consumption o f the pernicious drug; the stopping an ex-
cessive competi t ion, which, by an over-proportioned supply, 
would at length destroy the market abroad, the inability o f the 
cultivator to proceed in an expens ive and precarious culture, 
without a large advance o f capital, and lastly, the incapacity o f 
private merchants to supply that capital on the feeble security 
o f wretched farmers (/hid, p 2 7 0 ) 
The Ninth Report made the following comment on these argu-
ments : 
The last topic leads to a serious consideration o f the state o f the 
country. For in pushing it, the gentlemen argued, that in case 
such private merchants should advance the necessary capital, 
the lower cultivators "would get money in abundance". 
Admitting this fact, it s eems to be a part o f the policy o f this 
monopoly to prevent the cultivator from obtaining the fruits o f 
his labour. (Ihid.). 
The Company officials had alleged that if the cultivator obtained 
more as advances or profit they were likely to squander it, and would not 
be able to 'complete their engagements in full'. (Ibid., p.270-1). Law 
suits and fights would then ensue, between the different factors of the 
Company, creating disorder. However, the counter-argument of the Ninth 
Report was that competition was 'the natural corrective of the abuse, 
and the best remedy which could be applied to the disorder, even suppos-
ing its probable existence.' (Ibid., p.27l). 
The Company and its officials generally acted as both the judge 
and the jury, when Indian producers of cotton cloth, silk, opium or salt 
ever dared to complain. Burke's political economy was fully sensitive 
to the effect of this combination of power and pelf in the same authority. 
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Taking the case of the Indian cloth merchants of Dacca who had com-
plained of oppression by the Company's agents the Ninth Report ob-
served that the latter simply denied the charge, without producing any 
real evidence : 
In such cases of mutual assertion and denial your Committee 
are led irresistably to attach abuse to power, and to presume 
that suffering and hardship are more likely to attend on weak-
ness. than that any combination ofunprotected individuals is o f 
force to prevail over influence, power, wealth, and authority. 
The complaints of the native merchants ought not to have been 
treated in any of those modes, in which they have been treated, 
and when men are in the situation o f complainants against un-
bounded power,. . . their abandoning their suit is far from a full 
and clear proof o f their complaints being groundless {/bid, 
p.263). 
15. The remedial process suggested by Burke 
While Burke did not carry out the analysis of the effect of ex-
panding markets on productivity and income growth in the style of Adam 
Smith, he clearly brought out the contractionary effects of the coercive 
monopoly exercised by the Company. He went on to suggest measures, 
both of internal reform of the Company's administration, and of a change 
in the relation of the Company and its government to the Parliament, in 
order to set the reverse process going. He also recommended the re-
vival of a specific Indian agency, viz., merchant capital, as the carrier of 
the process of enrichment rather than its reverse : 
The effect, which so long continued a monopoly, followed by a 
pre-emption, and then by partial preferences supported by power, 
must necessarily have in weakening the mercantile capital, and 
disabling the merchants from all undertakings o f magnitude, is 
but too visible... 
... the long continuance o f abuse has in some measure con-
formed the whole trade o f the country to its false principle. To 
make a sudden change, therefore, might destroy the few ad-
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vantages wh.ch attend any trade, without securing those which 
must f low from one established upon sound mercantile prin-
ciples whenever such a trade can be established The fact is ' 
that the forcible direction which the trade o f India has had 
towards Europe, to the neglect, or rather to the total abandon-
ing o f the Asiatic, has o f itself tended to cany even the inter-
nal business from the native merchant. The revival of trade 
in the native hands is o f absolute necessity; but your Com-
mittee is o f opinion, that it will rather be the effect of a regu-
lar progressive course o f endeavours for that purpose than o f 
p 2 y 6 5 ) 8 U l a , 1 ° n ' h o w e v e r w i s e ' y conceived (Burke, 1783, 
On this showing Burke can be claimed as an early proponent of national 
bourgeo.s.e rather than foreign capital as the major agency of capitalis 
transformation James Mill may be regarded as being located almost a 
the opposite pole, especially on the basis of his evidence before the Par-
1975^'chapter ^0) C ° m m i t t e e E a S t I n d i a A f f a i r s o f 1831-32 (Barber, 
16. Burke's labours lost 
Most Of Burke's stupendous labours in the cause of justice to the 
Indian subjects of the East India Company's government in India - mer-
chants of cloth or silk,cultivators of mulberry, growers of cocoon,winders 
of silk yam or weavers of sdk cloth or cotton fabrics, growers of the opium 
poppy producers of salt from seawater (the malangis) - and for the promo-
non of Indian economic prosperity through free trade came to nought The 
Ind,a B, Is promoted by the Fox-North coalition were defeated. None of the 
chief culprits, who had repeatedly flouted the instruction of the Directors 
and hadI done so while oppressing their Company's Indian subjects in 
legal and illegal ways, were brought to book. The motion for impeach-
ment of Warren Hastings, while passed by the House of Commons was 
rejected by the House of Lords (Marshall, 1965, 1991). The only objects 
that were achieved were a partial reform of the system of Parliamentary 
supervision of the Company's afTairs under an Act passed under the 
administration of Will,am Pitt in 1784, and the reform of the central 
administration of the Company's government in India under the 
Governor Generalship of Lord Cornwallis (Majumdar, Raychaudhuri 
andDatta, 1978, pp.776-98). T h e s e reforms, combined with land tenure 
systems introduced between 1783 and 1813, and accompanied by changes 
in the economic structure that Burke analysed (with the hope that they 
could be reversed) had a paradoxical outcome. The tribute extracted from 
India was changed from being the resultant of an unsystematic commer-
cial policy and a fitful land tenure system into a systematic charge on 
public revenues as either the dividend of the East India Company or inter-
est on loans contracted by that Company in the name of its Indian posses-
sions, or as expenses incurred in England for canying on the government 
in India. Through these devices the tribute was rendered virtually invis-
ible to a political economist who regarded all debts, however generated, 
as being sacrosanct. Thus James Mill could argue in his evidence before 
the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the affairs of the East 
India Company (Mill, 1832 and Barber, 1975, p. 172) that Britain did not 
exact a tribute from India. And in this area as in many others, Mill's view 
became official orthodoxy and continued to reappear in imperialist 
apologetics down to the present (see, for example, Morison, 1911).4 
17. Survival of political economy as dissent: Anthony Lambert 
However, such orthodoxy had not yet crystallized beforq<the 
1820s and there are several notable instances of the use of political 
economy for fashioning a critique of colonial rule before it was put al-
most exclusively to the task of designing an apologetic structure for such 
rule. By then the changes that Burke foresaw, however darkly, had be-
come the stylized facts about India in most official discourse. 
The changes resulted, first of all, from the extraction of the trib-
ute. Even if the tribute had been extracted as a lump sum tax in real terms 
with no distortionary effects on the structure of prices or with no mon-
etary implications, it would still have diminished the real incomes of the 
peopl?, and eroded the base of accumulation very seriously. It is essen-
t i a l ly^ this light that Burke, and later commentators such as Anthony 
Lambert5 or Lord Lauderdale (1809) saw the problem. Sir James Stewart 
had already recognised the ineluctable conflict between the interests 
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of India and those of Britain in this matter of extraction of tribute. In view 
of the conflict Steuart thought, 'All that can be done in this particular, is to 
carry on the trade to the best advantage of the Company and for this 
nation [i.e. Great Britain - A.B. ], consistently with the permanency of it. 
Not to kill the golden goose which lays the golden eggs, but to feed her 
and preserve her'(Steuart, 1772, p.64, quoted by Barber, 1975, p.77). 
Lambert wrote his account of the maritime trade of Bengal in 
1794, when the war between Britain and France already affected that trade. 
He wanted the tribute to be restricted to the surplus revenues of Bengal 
and not extended to any monopoly of trade exercised by the Company 
(Colebrook and Lambert, 1795, p. 172). He estimated the surplus rev-
enue to be £.2.49 million for the year 1792-93. He provided a detailed 
account of the different sectors of Bengal's trade, claiming that it had 
thrived in every sector which was not restricted by the Company's mo-
nopoly or its harassing regulation. He claimed that the increased demand 
in Europe for 'eastern productions' had, 'in some measure maintained the 
same direction for the industry of Bengal, applied to arts and manufac-
tures, but, further than maintaining the direction of industry', it had been 
'no alleviation to the loss of the Indian demand for production' (Ibid., 
p.221). Lambert (and presumably, his co-author, Colebrooke, who was 
an official of the Company) squarely challenged the right of the Company's 
government to extract a tribute from India, especially as compensation 
for the expenses of conquest: 
A guard ian c a n have no claim to reimburse himself from the 
ward's estate, for the expense he incurs, in litigation, to ob-
tain a trust not spontaneously committed to him. Sovereignty 
is a similar trust, which imposes duties on the acquirer, but 
entitles him to no compensation for the expense and risk at 
which he acquired secure authority, where he had no preten-
sions, grounded on the voluntary election o f the subjects (Ibid., 
p.225). 
Lambert carried out a series of calculations showing that the land' 
revenue (which formed the largest part of total revenue of the Company's 
government) levied by the Company was far larger than had been 
extracted by the Mughals or the successor Indian governments, and 
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claimed that Bengal had been rapidly impoverished in the process, and 
was even 'beggared' (Ibid., p.228).6 
18. Lauderi lal"s c r i t ique of C o m p a n y rule : s h r i n k a g e of effec-
t ive d e m a n d as b o t h a s y m p t o m and c a u s e of I n d i a n 
i m p o v e r i s h m e n t 
The shrinkage of effective demand as a result of a continual 
export of a tribute without any return in goods was a major plank of Burke's 
and Lambert's allegation that the Company's rule had impoverished India. 
In the critique of that rule by Lord Lauderdale, this became a central ele-
ment. 
In his Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth, and 
into the Means and Causes of Its Increase, Lauderdale (1804) had made 
a distinction between individual riches and public wealth and had argued 
that a desire to accumulate in the form of capital goods beyond what could 
be profitably used, or a desire to save beyond the normal rate at which 
those savings could be used, could lead to a diminution of public wealth, 
although individuals might be enriched in the process (see especially, 
Ibid., chapter IV). Despite the claims made for Lauderdale as an early 
proponent of the theory of effective demand (Hansen, 1951, chapter 14), 
there is little doubt that Lauderdale failed to logically demonstrate the 
paradox of saving, mainly because he confounded the over-production of 
capital goods with the attempt to increase savings in the form of financial 
assets such as government bonds (Paglin, 1961, chapter IV; Paglin, 1987). 
However, Lauderdale's application to Indian affairs of his idea of expan-
sion or contraction of aggregate demand as a governing cause of enrich-
ment or impoverishment of nations was largely free from this kind of con-
fusion. 
Lauderdale's inquiry into the East India Company's affairs was 
provoked by its failure to honour the commitments it had made at the time 
of the renewal of its charter in 1793, and by the fact that the Company had 
again been obliged to borrow in India on a large scale (these debts, how-
ever, were redeemable in England) in order to cover the shortfall 
in its territorial revenues and procure its 'investment' (Lauderdale, 
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1809, pp. 1-4). Lauderdale's active hostility may have been aroused by the 
circumstance that his appointment as Governor-General in India had been 
blocked by the directors of the Company (Barber, 1975, pp. 115-7). One 
major failure of the Company was its inability to generate enough demand 
for British manufactures in its Indian territories. Lauderdale attributed this 
failure to the process of impoverishment of the Indian people under the 
Company's government. The basic criterion Lauderdale used for assess-
ing the performance of the Company's government in India was formu-
lated by him in the following way (Lauderdale, 1809, p. 13): 
A system of Government, generally speaking, is best to be 
judged of by the ease and affluencc of those who are governed, 
and by the probability it affords that the enjoyment of these 
blessings are [sic] secured agawxt interruption from internal 
commotion and external attack. 
Lauderdale was not going to pick out the faults of particular indi-
viduals, or simply blame the Company for either engaging in wars of con-
quest, or having to incur further debts in order to honour its obligation to 
the Parliament He quoted Warren Hastings, who, 'in reply to the instruc-
tions of the Court of Directors prohibiting all schemes of conquest and 
enlargement of dominion', had pointedly asked, "If the internal resources 
of a state are not equal to its wants, where can it obtain immediate relief but 
from external means?' (Lauderdale, 1809, p.25).7 
According to Lauderdale, 'the sure operation of the intercourse' 
between Britain and India was to impoverish the latter, and 'to disqualify it 
from sustaining the increased expenses' that the intercourse led to, and 
therefore, it was 'to the system itself we must look', for the violation of the 
principles laid down by the Parliament and others (Ibid.). 
Lauder dale then gave a detailed review of all the wars of the 
Company since the days of Hastings, and estimated the gains in territory 
and/or tribute made by the Company in each case. His sad comment on 
this history was that as regards the Indian rulers 'the object of our friend-
ship and our enmity has been the same, whether flatten' or force was the 
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means, extension of dominion has been uniformly the end' (Ibid., p. 28). So 
Lrtwderdale, no more than Burke, was a believer in the right of conquest or 
rule simply by the virtue of a higher level of 'civilization' - a right that 
James Mill was to assert explicitly or implicitly in 1817. 
Lauderdale did not consider the monopoly exercised by the Com-
pany as 'the most pressing' or 'the real' evil from which the demand for 
British manufactures in India suffered, claiming that even the extinction of 
the monopoly would not produce 'the salutary effect of opening that vent 
for the produce of Britain, much desired by the manufacturers'. (Ibid., 
p. 133). The real evil lay in the perversion of the normal mechanism of trade 
into a mere vehicle of remittance of tribute from the conquered territories 
(Lauderdale, 1809 (as quoted in); Baiber, 1975, pp. 118-25). This had even 
been recognized by the East India Company's own Report on the Export 
Trade published in 1793. However, this view of the matter disappeared 
from later official discourse, not just because, as Barber claimed, Lauder-
dale was known for his irascibility and his penchant for making enemies, 
but because the extraction of tribute was successfully absorbed into, and 
obscured by the fiscal and administrative operation of the state : payment 
of interest on debt contracted in the process of conquest of Indian territo-
ries by the revenues of those territories themselves and payment by the 
Indians for a British army of occupation and a coercive administrative 
apparatus in India and Britain came to be regarded as normal in the over-
lord-dependency relationship between Britain and India. 
The extraction of the tribute imposed an additional cost through 
the disturbance of the monetary system within the country. But somehow 
this aspect of the matter did not receive much attention even in the ac-
count of Colebrooke and Lambert (1795) although their work was in many 
ways quite penetrating in detailing the disturbance caused by the innova-
tions introduced by the British. For example, Colebrooke pointed out the 
paradoxical effect of abolition of sayer, a variety o/mternal tolls levied by 
the local rulers or magnates in return for protection and regulation of 
markets. When the sayer was abolished, markets disappeared from 
many regions of Bengal (Colebrooke and Lambert, 1795, p.48, see 
also Bagchi, 1992b). In this case, deregulation led to de-commercial-
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ization. The effect of demonetization of cowries and introduction of 
~ L r s f°r T t h e no,es of ,he Bank o f 
scarc.ty of media ofc.rculat.on and impeding trade was recorded in manv 
ters^3- ^ C U m e n , s ^ s e e Bagchi, 1982, and Bagch^l 987 chap-
19. The crit ique of colonialism submerged in apologetics of 
colonial rule as a discourse of political economy 
Burke had introduced a theme which did not surface in anv off 
cTp taT a sa r e su l t " J S ^ ^ " " ^ d e d " l e ^ cap.tal as a result of the coerc.ve monopoly exercised by the East India 
•s easily congealed mto a system of racalism with d I n c e s dehbe " 
ately created and automatically assumed between British citizens o Eu 
ropeans m general, and Indians and had a permanent effec n r e n d rt2" 
competition between Europeans and Indians an unequal on so o r J 
British rule over India endured.8 8 
We have briefly sketched above the malien e f f e c t , n f t h , ^ • 
or ,he tributary relationship between India and 
discrimination agamst Indian capital built into , h e p a t l e w J r " T 
inunon There was ye, another set of pressures bmldinTup a „ n 
dtan artisanal manufactures, and henee against any possfbi , W t h e 
ens,on of di vision of .abour in those fields translating itse Tnto ech„I" 
progress and thereby allowing India to make anv headway in eoTnp . 
rn on with the burgeoning British industrial exports. Tins fae"o " as a 
S f e S i r T V e n 'nd,a ,m°a S0U r« * 
market for British manufactures, and to suppress Indtan manufactures 
ever such competition could pose a threat. The Ninth Report analysed 
how. in order to appease producers of British silk fabrics, the East India 
Company systematically discouraged the production of silk cloth in India 
and diverted the output of raw silk into the production of silk yarn instead 
(Burke, 1783, pp.253-8). In the case of cotton cloth, most varieties pro-
duced in India were already more or less banned in Britain under sumptuary 
regulations or prohibitive tariffs. With continued advances in British ma-
chine-bascd technology for spinning and weaving cotton and with the 
reduction of most Indian weavers within the Company's territories to a 
condition of 'vassalage' of 'servitude' (to use the language of official 
correspondence: cf. Warren Hastings to Richard Barwell, 10 June, 1774, 
Add. Ms. 29225, f. 316, India Office Records, quoted by RJ. Marshall in 
Burke. 1783, p.258n), British manufactures of yarn and less definitely, of 
cotton fabrics, were outpacing Indian artisanal output in terms of cost and 
price. The bleak future of Indian handloom production was already par-
tially foretold in Colebrooke and Lambert (1795). Soon after the abolition 
of the Company's monopoly of trade with India, Indian fabrics disap-
peared from the Company's 'investments' and hence exports from India to 
Europe. With Indian cloth suffering from reverse protection compared 
with British fabrics (Trevelyan, 1835; and Dutt, 1906, chapters XIV-XV), 
the same fate overtook a very large fraction of Indian handloom produce 
directed towards the domestic market as well. 
The East India Company's government raised the major fraction 
of its taxes from land. As the sayer, or the internal revenue was reduced or 
abolished, the weight of land taxes in total tax revenues of the government 
very probably increased by the end of the century. Such a trend was quite 
the reverse of what was happening in England during the eighteenth cen-
tury, and at least some British observers were aware that it might not be the 
best policy for promoting the prosperity of the country to burden the 
peasant with a heavy tax demand. For example, Henry St. George Tucker, 
who rose later to be the Accountant General of Bengal or the official 
looking after the finances of the Company's government, and became the 
effective founder of the Bank of Bengal, discoursed in 1790 (in his letters 
to Thomas Law) 'on the advantage of raising the principal revenue of the 
country from customs-duties upon manufactured articles rather than 
resorting for the supplies of the State, exclusively to an immod-
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erate land-tax' (Kaye, 1854, p.62). However, this programme of raising 
more taxes through customs duties could not be implemented because (a) 
the importers and exporters were the foreign merchants who were also 
the rulers, (b) the base of domestic manufactures on which the excise or 
internal customs duties could be imposed was either stagnant or shrink-
ing, and (c) the recovery from the famine in 1770 was leading again to a fast 
extension of cultivation and hence the land tax. 
There was an intense debate on the form the land tax should take 
from the 1760s (Ambirajan, 1978; Ascoli, 1917,Bagchi, 1992c; Dutt, 1906; 
Firminger, 1917-18; Guha, 1981; Stein, 1989; Stokes, 1959). The basic is-
sues debated were whether there was any privyte property in land before 
the advent of British rule; whether the big tax-farmers (who were called 
'zamindars' in Bengal, but the word 'zamindar' meant holders of different 
kinds of property rights in different parts of India) had a claim to the land 
revenue; whether the land tax should be exacted from the large tax-farmers, 
or the actual occupiers (called raiyats or ryots/ The British ultimately 
introduced different forms of land tenure, viz. the zamindari or "Permanent 
Settlement with tax-farmers in Bengal and Bihar and the raiyatwari settle-
ment or .settlement with recognized occupiers (but not necessarily with the 
actual cultivators) in southern and western India. One thing the British 
rulers did not do was to institute unrestricted private property in land, 
except in some districts earmarked for opening up by Europeans growing 
tea or coffee under a plantation system (Bagchi, 1992c). This basic differ-
ence between the British Indian land tenure systems and land tenure in 
Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth century was obscured in the lit-
erature. 
James Mill's History of Britis/j India has been seen as a docu-
ment which challenged all earlier ideas of a developed civilization in India, 
especially before the advent of Turkish or Mughal ('Muslim') rule in India 
(Barber, 1975, chapter 8; Majeed, 1992). Even before him Hegel, in several 
fragments written over the period 1797-1800, seems to have challenged the 
notion that a non-European nation could have any history of progress or 
cultural development (Avineri, 1972, p.8). Hegel developed the same basic 
ideas in his Lecures on the Philosophy of History (Avineri, 1972, 
pp.224-5). However, it was Mill's way of dealing with these 
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issues that became part of the standard orthodoxy. While Mill's denigra-
tion of all non-European civilization was noticed, what was not noticed 
was the singular manner in which he dismissed all issues relating to the 
actual mechanism of working of markets - issues that were central to 
Burke's idea that markets must be moved by the energies of the people 
who work them and who are affected by them. What has also not been 
noticed is that beyond the idea that the British rulers would provide law 
and order to the Indians, Mill had no concrete proposal for 'civilizing' 
them. The nearest he came to it was to suggest that Europeans would 
invest in India and familiarize the Indians with modern techniques and 
methods of organizations (Barber, 1975, chapter 9). It is no wonder that 
Thomas Babington Macaulay who had been such a severe critic of Mil's 
essay on 'Government' in the Encyclopaedia Bxitannica should have 
greatly admired Mill's History of India But Macaulay had a programme 
for bringing the light of European civilization to Indians. Mill would not 
commit himself to anything which would involve additional expenditure 
on the part of the Company's government. In that sense James Mill was a 
perfect proponent of 'negative freedom' as far as India was concerned : 
but, the big brother of a government, manned almost exclusively by for-
eigners at the top and controlled by a foreign legislature, would be decid-
ing everything relating to the zone within which that negative freedom 
would be exercised. 
The debate between Hume, Tucker and contemporaries as to 
whether free trade would equalize the fortunes of rich and poor nations 
became irrelevant as tribute remittances took the place of trade, and fiscal 
exactions replaced commercial profit in the relation between the conquer-
ing rich and the conquered poor. The fiscalization of the tribute and the 
conversion of all expenditures into a self-ransoming debt to be serviced 
by the conquered peoples neatly excised questions of political morality 
when it came to relations between the ruling nation and the ruled. The 
subversive agency of a full-blown political economy in which politics 
defined the context within which economics worked was suppressed in 
the official discourse and political economy became primarily a discourse 
of mastery or dominance. It took the explosion of Marxism and resurgent 
nationalism in the context of a global network of imperialism for the sub-
versive power of political economy to manifest itself again. 
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Footnotes 
1 This was a chair of modern history and political economy at East India 
College that was first located at Herford but was soon moved to 
Haileybury. 
2. Pocock (1985m p. 159) is thus slightly wrong in suggesting that Tuckcr 
owed his hatred of wars for the sake of trade to the experience of hav-
ing lived through the Seven Years' War (1756-63). 
3. More than a decade of Burke's parliamentary career was devoted to 
Indian problems; his Indian writings took up seven of the sixteen vol-
umes of his collected works that was available prior to the edition of 
the Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke with Paul Langford as 
general editor and published by Oxford University Press. Macpherson 
(1980, p.30) also mentions the well-known fact that Burk himself 
regarded his Indian work as the most important achievement for which 
he should be remembered. Yet there is virtually no discussion of 
Burke's views on India or their relation to the rest of his corpus in 
Macpherson (1980) - the total number of pages in the text of 80 pages 
devoted to India being less than three. The only recent author outside 
the circle of specialists interested in South Asian histoiy to have de-
voted proper attention to Burke's writings on India is Conor Cruise 
O'Brien (O'Brien, 1992). This is symptomatic of'silence' about the 
Indian concerns of many other eighteenth and nineteenth centuiy po-
litical economists among the current students of economic and po-
litical thought. For example, Morton Paglin, in neither his book on 
Lauderdale and Malthus (Paglin, 1961) nor his entry on Lauderdale in 
the New Palgrave (Paglin, 1987) mentions Lauderdale's tract on In-
dia (Lauderdale, 1809). Similarly, in his two-volume book on John 
Stuart Mill, Hollander (1985) does not find it necessaiy to discuss 
any of Mill's writings on India although the latter spent all his work-
ing life as an official of the East India Company's establishment in 
London. 
50 
4. It is interesting to note that James Mill's views in this oral evidence 
have very little relation to the detailed analysis of his History of 
India, which was first published in 1817 and which was republished in 
1826 in a third edition, the last to appear in Mill's lifetime (Winch, 
1966, p.397). In Vol.VI of the History (Mill, 1817, Vol. VI, pp.470-
480), Mill formulated a criterion for the financial success of a colony 
which was exactly the opposite of the one formulated in 1795 by 
Colebrooke and Lambert: 'If India affords a surplus revenue which 
can be sent to England, thus far is India beneficial to England. If the 
revenue of India is not equal to the expense of governing India, then is 
India a burden and a drain to England' (Ibid., p. 471). If a new territory 
was to be acquired through conquest, 'the new territory must increase 
the charges in a degree adequate to the interest and redemption of the 
whole sum expended in the war, otherwise the acquisition is a positive 
loss' (Ibid.). Judged in this light, he found all the acquisitions under 
the Marquis of Wellesley's administration a loss-making proposition. 
He also found that the total debt of the East India Company had in-
creased enormously between 1793 and 1805. But this, of course, did 
not lead him to conclude that England should give up those acquisi-
tions because he had enunciated the principle of 'self-ransoming' on 
the part of the conquered territoiy. 
5. Anthony Lambert, a free British merchant working in Calcutta wrote 
the part on the external commerce of Bengal in Colebrooke and Lam-
bert (1795). When this book was revised and published in a new edi-
tion by Colebrooke in 1804, the part on external commerce was omit-
ted : Lambert had died in the interval. 
6. The 'drain' of wealth from Bengal through the tributary operations of 
the East India Company was estimated by Lambert at £. 1.5 million 
per year on an average over the period from 1765 to 1793 (Colebrooke 
• and Lambert, 1795, p.246). 
7. Hastings' oft-quoted remark was made in a minute dated 10 January, 
1776. 
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8. For discussion of racialism in creating barriers against competition 
by Indians, see Bagchi, 1972, chapter 6; for discussion of the way in 
which local Indian capital was decimated in Bengal in the nineteenth 
century see Sinha, 1970, and how it managed to survive in Bombay 
see Bagchi, 1972, chapter 6 and Bagchi, 1987, chapters 2-6, 12-14. 
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